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Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way: Cooperation in
Canada-U.S. Antitrust Relations
Lawson A. W. Hunter, Q.C.*
Susan M. Hutton**
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

he title of the Canada-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding as to
Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws" (MOU) might understandably
create the impression that the antitrust enforcement agencies in the
two countries are already involved in significant cooperation in the investigation of individual antitrust cases under the aegis of the MOU. A
review of the history of the MOU and of the continuing structural impediments to meaningful cooperation reveals, however, that CanadaU.S. cooperation in antitrust enforcement is still in its infancy. Nonetheless, recent developments in transborder economic activity have
highlighted the necessity for such cooperation at the same time that
greater understanding has increased its chances for success.
Part II of this paper reviews the history of the MOU including the
significant instances of antitrust friction which form its background.
Factors supporting a more cooperative approach to transborder antitrust enforcement, including increased economic globalization, and increased harmony in the substantive laws of the two countries will be
reviewed in Part III. Options for reform are presented in Part IV.
II.

HISTORY OF THE

MOU:

CONFLICT IN ANTITRUST RELATIONS

At the outset it should be emphasized that the history of antitrust
relations between Canada and the United States has generally been
fairly smooth. For example, George Addy, the Director of Investigation
and Research under the Competition Act (the Director) who is now
Canada's top competition law enforcer, has recognized that as early as
1901 a Canadian inquiry into price fixing in the Canadian market for
newsprint gathered evidence in Montreal, Toronto and New York and
*Partner,

Stikeman, Elliott, Ottawa, Ontario.

** Associate, Stikeman, Elliott, Ottawa, Ontario.

Note: At the request of the authors, Canadian statutes have been cited using standard Canadian
citation.
I Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with respect to
the Application of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 275.
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lead to the uncovering of a similar conspiracy operating in the United
States.'
Indeed, Canada has undoubtedly been the beneficiary of histori-

cally vigorous U.S. antitrust enforcement.' Nonetheless, conflict is
more noteworthy than cooperation, and the most celebrated instances

of antitrust interaction have been instances which caused serious political conflict between the two countries.

In 1947, for instance, in the course of another investigation involving the paper industry, a U.S. grand jury issued a subpoena to Canadian International Paper Company and International Paper Sales Company, Inc., both Canadian companies ultimately owned by the U.S.
target of the investigation, International Paper Company. Despite the

Canadian companies' objections to service, the U.S. court held that
their sales offices in New York and the maintenance of salaried employees in the United States constituted "doing business" in the United
States. The two Canadian corporations were held to have submitted to

U.S. jurisdiction and were ordered to produce documents located in
Canada. 4 The controversy surrounding this extraterritorial assertion of

jurisdiction by the grand jury ultimately concluded in the passage of
blocking legislation in both Ontario and Quebec designed to prohibit
the removal of any business records in compliance with a request or
order from any governmental authority outside of the province.5
' JOHN BALL, CANADIAN ANTITRUST LEGISLATION (Baltimore:

The Williams & Wilkins

Company, 1934) 13-17, cited in George N. Addy, International Coordination of Competition
Policies, in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY, 291 (Kantzenbach
et al. eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellcshaft, 1993).
3 "In spite of .. differing attitudes toward government regulation and antitrust enforcement,
there is a great deal of commonality between the two nations, and the benefits to Canada of
having a contiguous neighbor with a vigorous system of domestic antitrust enforcement do not go
unnoticed." Gary E. Dyal, The Canada United States Memorandum Regarding Application of
National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of MultinationalEnforcement Disputes,
6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1065, 1070 (1984-85).
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
5 Business Records Protection Act, S.O. 1947, c.10 (codified at R.S.O. 1990, ch. B19); Business Concerns Records Act, [1957-58] S.Q., c.42 (codified at R.S.Q. c.D-12).
It should be noted that the constitutional validity of these provincial blocking statutes was
recently struck down as they apply to information requested by courts in other Canadian provinces. Hunt v. T&N plc, (1993), [1994] 1 WWR 129 (S.C.C.), 85 B.C. L. REV. (2d) 1, 161 N.R.
81. However, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly refused to comment on the validity of
provincial blocking legislation as it applies to information requests from foreign countries such as
the United States. The Court at several points took pains to distinguish interprovincial from international information requests. Still, the finding that the blocking legislation related in "pith and
substance" to matters outside of the province in question, as well as statements regarding the
increased need to consider comity in light of the globalization of business might suggest that the
provincial legislation would not be upheld in its application to international information requests.
Determination of the constitutional validity of the provincial blocking statutes as they apply to
requests from foreign countries will have to await the appropriate case.
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Shortly thereafter, the Radio Patents Cases6 again brought the
overlapping nature of national antitrust enforcement activities to the
fore when the United States brought proceedings against the U.S. parents of several Canadian producers of radios and televisions. The Canadian subsidiaries had formed Canadian Radio Patents Limited and assigned their patents for radio and television production to that
company. Through the enforcement of its patents and its licensing arrangements, Canadian Radio Patents Limited effectively forced companies wishing to sell home entertainment products in Canada to establish
manufacturing facilities in Canada. Civil antitrust suits were filed in
the U.S. against the parent U.S. companies alleging an unlawful combination in the restraint of U.S. exports. The Radio Patents Cases ended in consent decrees which enjoined the defendants, and their Canadian subsidiaries, from participating in any agreement which restricted
the export of goods from the United States.
The Radio Patents Cases caused outrage in Canada, and lead to
formal and informal diplomatic protests by the Canadian government.
In the view of the Canadian government, the impugned actions related
to Canadian commercial interests. The Canadian government felt that
if lawful economic activity in Canada ran counter to U.S. interests,
then the U.S. should have protested such activity through the proper
diplomatic channels rather than resorting to unilateral action in its own
courts. The discussions between then Canadian Justice Minister E. Davie Fulton and then U.S. Attorney General William P. Rogers eventually lead to the 1959 Bilateral Understanding regarding Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure (the Fulton-Rogers
Understanding). This first incarnation of the present MOU provided
for intergovernmental discussions "whenever it becomes apparent that
the interests of one of our countries are likely to be affected by the
enforcement of the antitrust laws of the other," and in any event prior
to the initiation of any suit involving the interests of the other country.
No circumstances requiring consultations were spelled out. Understandably, in light of the history of the understanding,
there was no
mention of cooperation in antitrust enforcement.7
Of course, antitrust friction has not been confined to Canada-U.S.
relations, and by 1967, the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) adopted a set of recommendations to member states, in addition to the type of notification and consultation already provided for in the Fulton-Rogers Understanding, to coordinate
6 United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F.
Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States and General Electric Company, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, N.V. Philips, TRADE CASES, paras 70,342, 70,420, 70,546 (1962). See, e.g., B.R.
Campbell, The Canada - United States Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure: A
Study in Bilateral Conflict Resolution, 56 CAN. BAR REv. 459, 460-2 (1978).
' Dyal, supra note 3, at 1083-84; Campbell, supra note 6, at 463.
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enforcement actions, exchange relevant information and cooperate in
the development and implementation of legislation regarding restrictive

trade practices.' Despite, or perhaps in light of, further instances in
which the U.S. courts enforced U.S. antitrust laws in a manner which
impacted upon Canadian sovereignty or national interests," in 1969
then Canadian Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs Ron Basford and then U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell agreed to supplement the notification and consultation procedures of the Fulton-Rogers

Understanding with information sharing and coordination of enforcement activities, to the extent possible under each country's domestic
laws.' 0
The inability of these Understandings to resolve serious antitrust
disputes between the two countries were exemplified by the Potash and
Uranium disputes during the 1970's. 11 In June, 1976, the United States
government launched federal grand jury"2 as well as civil 3 proceedings
against eight U.S. corporations and several unnamed and unindicted
co-conspirators on charges of conspiracy to restrain competition in the
sale of potash in the United States. The charges alleged that the Government of Saskatchewan had been encouraged by potash producers to

establish a prorationing and price support arrangement for the CanadaU.S. potash market. When a motion for particulars resulted in the dis8 Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, October 5, 1967, OECD Doc.
C(67)53 (Final). Several OECD Recommendations were issued over the years, the most recent in
1986 (June 5, 1986, OECD Doc. C(86)44 (Final)).
9 Continental Ore Company v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, 370 U.S. 690
(1962): despite the fact that a Canadian defendant had carried out behavior which lead to the
monopolization of the Canadian market for ferrovanadium and vanadium oxide, and had done so
as the purchasing agent for the Canadian government, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the
defendants are not insulated. . .by the fact that their conspiracy involved some acts by the agent
of a foreign government." The Canadian government had not required Union Carbide's Canadian
subsidiary to refuse to purchase from Continental Ore Company, and the foreign sovereign compulsion defense was therefore held to be inapplicable.
United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company, 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per
curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). In this case, Schlitz was ordered to divest itself of a controlling
39.3% interest in the stock of John Labatt Limited because of the anticompetitive effect that
Labatt's controlling interest in a California brewer would have caused in California. Note that the
court prohibited the entire transaction rather than merely ordering the divestiture of the offending
California assets.
These and fourteen other U.S. antitrust cases involving Canadian parties are briefed in Joseph P. Griffin, The Impact on Canada of the ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Antitrust
Laws 57 ANTITRUST L. J., 435, Appendix, 447-58 (1988).
'0 Canada-United States: Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation in Antitrust Matters, 8
I.L.M. 1305 (1969) [hereinafter Basford-Mitchell Understanding].
"
Discussed in Campbell, supra note 6, at 486 et seq.
12 United States v. Amax Inc., Amax Chemical Corp., Duval Corp., Duval Chemical Corp.,
National Potash Co., Potash Co. of America, 1 TRADE CASES 71, 793 (1977). The criminal
charges were eventually dismissed.
13 United States v. Amax Inc. et al, No. 76 Civ. C2393 (Complaint, D. Ill. June 29th, 1976).
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closure that the unnamed co-conspirators included a former Premier
(by that time dead) and a former Minister of the Saskatchewan cabinet as well as numerous other Saskatchewan civil servants, Canadian
national pride was affronted and the perceived usurpation by the
United States of Canadian sovereignty with respect to its natural resources was denounced.1"
Probably the most celebrated case of antitrust enforcement conflict
arose in the course of proceedings related to an international uranium
cartel. The genesis of the dispute lay in the closure of the U.S. market
to uranium imports and in the subsequent formation, at the behest of
the governments of uranium exporting countries including Canada, the
U.K., Australia and France, of a uranium producers cartel. Whether as
a result of actions taken by the cartel, or as a result of the closure of
the U.S. market to imports, or as a result of increased demand after
the first oil shock, or some combination thereof, the price for uranium
in the United States skyrocketed. Meanwhile, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation had entered into long-term uranium supply contracts with
several power utilities at fixed prices without ensuring a corresponding
long-term source. Westinghouse faced billions of dollars in losses due to
the sudden increase in prices. When Westinghouse sought to renege on
the contracts on the grounds of commercial impracticability, the power
utilities sued and Westinghouse sought to assert the existence and operation of the cartel in its defense.' 5 Westinghouse also launched a private treble damages action against twenty-nine uranium producers, on
the basis of the same facts. 6 Meanwhile, in early 1976, a grand jury
investigation was launched to inquire into possible criminal violations
arising out of the cartel." The decision by the U.S. courts that they
had jurisdiction to inquire into the activities of a cartel whose members
and activities were located entirely outside of the United States, whose
activities were sanctioned and encouraged by foreign governments, and8
whose intended effects expressly excluded the domestic U.S. market1
offended the governments of more than just Canada. The Canadian
government reacted to the U.S. court orders for the examination of
Canadian witnesses and documents located in Canada by issuing the
14 Campbell, supra note 6, at 486-7.
15 The suits were eventually consolidated into two actions: Duquesne Light Company, Ohio

Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, No.
GD75-23978 (Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civ. Pa. (in equity)); and Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation, MISC 6728, MDL No. 235 (E.D. Va.)
cited in Campbell, supra note 6, at 488.
16 Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Rio Algom Inc. et al, No. 76C-3630, (N.D. Ill.),
cited in Campbell, supra note 6, at 488.
17 For details of the various proceedings, see Campbell, supra note 6, at 487-90; also, Griffin,
supra note 9, at 451-2.
18 In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), cited in Griffin, supra
note 9, at 451.

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:101 1994

Uranium Information Security Regulations,9 the validity of which the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld.2"
The fact that the notification and consultation procedures embodied in the Fulton-Rogers and Basford-Mitchell Understandings were
scrupulously followed in both the Potash and the Uranium cases served
to illustrate the shortcomings of those agreements. Perhaps no agreement could have resolved the underlying differences in industrial and
antitrust policies which lead to the conflicts between government supported Canadian resource industries and U.S. antitrust law in the Potash and Uranium cases. It is possible, however, that several deficiencies
inherent in the text of the Understandings precluded their ability to
avoid or resolve serious conflict." The Understandings failed to define
the circumstances in which antitrust consultation would be implemented. Similarly, the circumstances under which Canadian blocking
legislation might be implemented were not mentioned. The understandings also failed to provide for the representation of Canadian concerns
over sovereignty and the national interest in private antitrust suits, and
there was no mention of export cartels. Antitrust cooperation was mentioned, but there was no provision for the confidentiality of information
disclosed by the parties. "Lack of concrete terms, workable standards,
''22
and overall detail pervade[d] the agreement.
The aftermath of the antitrust friction of the 1970's saw the enactment in late 1984 of generic Canadian blocking legislation designed to
permit the Attorney General of Canada to prevent compliance with any
foreign request for evidence from Canada.23 Just prior to this, however,
Canada and the United States had entered into another understanding
regarding notification, consultation and cooperation in antitrust enforcement, the MOU.24 The MOU contains much more detailed provisions designed to avoid antitrust conflicts between the two countries,
while expressly recognizing that each country remains free to apply its
national laws as it sees fit. The circumstances requiring notification are
spelled out in detail. Each country will attempt to obtain the information necessary to its antitrust enforcement from within its own borders.
If necessary, either country may seek information located in the other
19

SOR/77-836, 11 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at 4619 (1977) (replacing Uranium Information Secur-

ity Regulations, SOR/76-644, 110 CAN. GAZ. pt. II at 39 (1976)).
20 Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gulf Canada Ltd. et al., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 39 (1980).
21 James W. King, A Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of Bilateral Agreements in
Resolving Dispute Between Sovereigns Arising From ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust
Law: The Australian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 49, 66 (1983).
22 Id. at 68.
23 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29 [hereinafter FEMA]. The
FEMA came into force on February 14, 1985.
24 Principles of guidance to officials had also been agreed to in 1977 by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and Ministers of Justice and Consumer and Corporate Affairs
and by the United States Attorney General; see Preamble to 1984 MOU, supra note 1.
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country, but will first notify that country and provide an opportunity to
seek consultations prior to actually requesting the information. Information requests arising out of private litigation will not necessarily be
known to the government of the country where the litigation is taking
place and so is not subject to the advance consultation requirements.
Nonetheless, a country whose interests are affected by such a private
request for information can request consultations.
Blocking legislation is specifically addressed in the 1984 MOU,
with each country promising not to block access by the other's private
or public parties to information located within its borders or from its
nationals unless such access would be contrary to a "significant national interest," and only after consulting with the government of the
requesting party. The understanding does not define the term "significant national interest," but the MOU states that such interests might
normally be expected to be exhibited in antecedent laws, decisions or
statements of policy, thus implying that ad hoc reactions to the mere
fact of the extraterritorial enforcement of the other country's laws were
not envisaged in and of themselves as forming the basis of invoking
blocking legislation under the MOU.
The 1984 MOU went some way toward clarifying a workable procedure for ensuring that each country considers the interests of the
other before irrevocably determining a course of antitrust enforcement
conduct. Despite its name, however, there is little in the MOU actually
to enhance cooperation in antitrust enforcement between the two countries. Nonetheless, such cooperation has been enhanced somewhat
under the auspices of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty (MLAT) which was signed on March 18, 1985 and entered
into force on January 24, 1990.11
Under the MLAT and its implementing legislation in Canada,26 a
U.S. authority investigating or prosecuting an indictable criminal offense can apply to the Canadian Minister of Justice for assistance in
obtaining a Canadian court order for the gathering of evidence in Canada. If the Minister of Justice approves the request, the Minister must
provide the Canadian "competent authority" responsible for conducting
investigations or prosecuting offenses in Canada (i.e., in the case of
Canadian competition law, the Director or any of the Canadian or provincial Attorneys General or police forces, as appropriate) with any
documents or information necessary to apply for a court order. The
Canadian competent authority must then apply ex parte to a provincial
court for an order to gather evidence. The judge will issue a court order
if (s)he is satisfied that 1) an offense has been committed for which the
penalty is one or more years' imprisonment and with respect to which
"

CAN GAz. pt. I, 953 (1990).

26

Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M-13.6.
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the foreign state has jurisdiction, 2) evidence of the commission of the
offense, or information that may reveal the whereabouts of a person
who is suspected of having committed the offense, will be found in Canada, and 3) the order need not be refused on other public policy
grounds. While Article II of the MLAT does provide that "assistance"
to foreign states may include the exchange of information and objects
and the provision of documents and records, Article XIII of the MLAT
clarifies that the governments will provide public documents, and nonpublic documents only "to the' same extent and under the same conditions as would be available to its own law enforcement and judicial
authorities." Furthermore, by virtue of section 3 of the MLAA, the
provisions of the Competition Act prohibiting the disclosure of nonpublic information gathered by the Director pursuant to his powers to
compel information under that Act prevail over inconsistent provisions
of the MLAA.
The adoption of specific procedures for cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of all criminal matters under the MLAT has
proven to be a useful mechanism for gathering evidence relating to
criminal antitrust violations in both countries. However, its procedures
are not mandatory, and there is no provision for more informal antitrust cooperation between the two countries, nor for cooperation in respect of civil matters.
Although there has been comparatively little antitrust friction
since the adoption of the 1984 MOU,2 7 and comparatively more antitrust cooperation, there is a need to update the MOU in light of the
changed shape of antitrust enforcement since 1984. The forces contributing to the shift in focus from "friction" to "cooperation" will now
briefly be reviewed.
III.

FORCES FOR COOPERATION IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

It has become almost a clich6 to refer to the increasing internationalization of business. Successive GATT rounds have brought down
tariff and other barriers to worldwide trade since the Second World
War. The economic integration of the European Economic Community
(EEC) has seen the creation of a single unified market for goods and
services with complete factor mobility among its member states. The
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and now the North American
Free Trade Agreement will result eventually in a free trade zone encompassing Canada, the United States and Mexico, with the possibility
27 This fact may owe more to the increasing confluence of antitrust policies in the two countries and to the decreasing involvement of Canadian governments in the affairs of business than to
any real "teeth" in the MOU. Similar observations have been made in respect of the Agreement
Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S. Germany 15 I.L.M. 1282; King, supra note 21, at 68.
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of accession by other Latin American countries. Members of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have also been discussing mea-

sures to facilitate trade and investment among economies bordering on
the Pacific Rim.
As barriers to trade have fallen, the international flow of goods

and services has increased dramatically.28 As more companies in more
countries take part in the export trade or opportunities for the provision
of services abroad, the possibility that anti-competitive actions under-

taken by those companies will have economic effects in other countries
increases correspondingly. In light of 29the now more widely-accepted
"effects" test for antitrust jurisdiction,

the rise in world trade flows

has also increased the possibility for concurrent jurisdiction of two or
more antitrust enforcement agencies over the same international economic activity. The growing interdependence of the world's economies
has increased the need for a coordinated approach to antitrust enforce-

ment and the concomitant need to avoid disputes over antitrust
jurisdiction.
Not only has trade in goods and services increased, but the more
than 34% increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between
1983 and 1989 bears witness to the increasing "globalization" of economic actors. 30 Spurred in part by the liberalization of investment regimes in both developed and developing countries during the 1980's,
and in part by a desire to circumvent those barriers to trade which
continue to exist, the largest economic actors in many countries increasingly are companies based in multiple jurisdictions. Technological
advances in international communications have decreased the economic
distance between countries. In addition, the development of the interna28 Statistics

drawn from the October, 1993 edition,

WORLD ECON. OUTLOOK

(IMF, Wash-

ington, D.C.) and from annual editions of the INT'L FIN. STAT. Y.B. (OECD, Paris) indicate that
world trade has increased by more than 6,000% in nominal terms since 1948; in real terms,
average annual growth in world trade has exceeded growth in global production by several percentage points in the 1970-79 and 1980-92 periods.
20 This ground for accepting subject matter jurisdiction to consider the actions of foreign
nationals on the basis of their effects on the domestic economy was expressed in the United States
in the oft-cited Alcoa decision. United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945). The European Commission's assertion of jurisdiction on this basis dates back to Dyestuffs, July 24, 1969, J.O. L195/1, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. paras. 2011.59, 2021.26, and
2524.31. While not expressly dealing with antitrust law, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision
in Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 202, endorsed the application in general of Canadian criminal law on the basis of the effects test. Restrictive Business Practices of Multinational
Enterprises,THE OECD REP., para. 120, cited in William C. Graham, The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 11 C.B.L.J. 411, note 76 at 433 (1986), states that the "effects doctrine" is
recognized in antitrust legislation in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Spain, France, Sweden and
Finland and in the case law of Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United States and the EEC.
20 Christopher Bail, Coordination and Integration of Competition Policies:A Plea for Multinational Rules, in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY, 279
(Kautzenbach et al. eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgeselleshaft, 1993).
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tional financial markets made possible by modern telecommunications
has been cited as a factor which has contributed to the growth in multinational enterprises (MNE's)*1
The growth of MNE's has also brought .to light some limitations
on a purely national approach to antitrust enforcement.32 Intra-group
cost allocations, transfer pricing, and cross-subsidization are all potentially useful tools to assist an MNE wishing to develop a dominant position in any particular market, and to successfully evade an investigation launched by any particular national antitrust enforcement agency.
A substantial lessening of competition, for example, might be difficult
to prove if verifiable data on foreign cost structures is unattainable.
Although less amenable to statistical proof than the increase in
international investment and merger activity, "international cooperation agreements" or "strategic alliances" have also been discussed in
the antitrust literature, and their anti-competitive potential has been
noted.3 3 The increasingly global nature of important economic actors
makes the need for cooperation and coordination in the investigation of
transnational antitrust violations imperative for the maintenance of
healthy competitive markets. As trade barriers fall, antitrust authorities must ensure that the market restricting effects of governmentally
imposed trade measures are not replaced by collusive behavior or abuse
of dominant market position by transnational corporations. Indeed,
"...it is widely agreed that international markets, as domestic ones,
cannot simply be left to themselves. They need a coherent regulatory
framework ensuring that the expected benefits of the market economy
are not undermined by the behavior of governments and private actors
and that common goods and public interests are safeguarded." 4
Cooperation and coordination of a preventative nature in the form
of multi-jurisdictional merger review is also required, both for the sake
of the efficacy of such merger review in preventing anti-competitive
concentrations, and for the sake of the MNE's involved who are currently subjected to widely differing procedural and substantive elements
of antitrust law. A few examples of recent multijurisdictional merger
reviews will suffice to underscore the need for enhanced cooperation on
this front.
Probably the most well-known example in Canada is the proposed
31Id. at 279.
32

Rolf Jungnickel and George Koopmann, Globalizationof Business: Implicationsfor Inter-

national Competition and Related Policies, in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD ECONOMY 33, 41 (Kautzenbach et al. eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellcshaft
1993).
33A. Edward Safarian, Have TransnationalMergers or Joint Ventures Increased?, in COM9, 24 (Kautzenbach et al. eds.,

PETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY,

Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellcshaft 1993).
3' Bail, Coordination and Integration of Competition Policies: A Plea for Multilateral
Rules, supra note 30, at 280.
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takeover of Boeing's commuter aircraft division, de Havilland, by
Avions de Transport Regional (ATR), a French-Italian consortium between Aerospatiale SA and Alenia SpA. De Havilland's assets were
located in Canada, but the transaction was also subject to review under
the EC Merger Regulation.35 Canadian and EC authorities cooperated
to the fullest extent possible within their respective statutory constraints and agreed on a definition of the market involved (the worldwide market for commuter aircraft). The Canadian authorities approved the transaction on the basis that the matter raised insufficient
competition concerns in Canada to justify interfering with the transaction. The European Commission, however, declined to approve the
transaction, since the consortium would have had 50% of the world
market and 67 % of the EC market for commuter aircraft. The differential impact of the transaction on different market segments, as well
as substantive differences in the merger review statutes, lead to completely opposite results.36
The regulatory burdens which can result from a plethora of reviewing jurisdictions is perhaps best exemplified by the proposed Gillette/Wilkinson combination. Firms based in the United States, Sweden and the Netherlands were involved in the proposed transaction,
which was ultimately reviewed by eight different antitrust authorities,
including Canada, Germany, Britain, France, the EC and the United
States. First proposed in 1989, the transaction was the subject of a
consent decree with respect to U.S. intellectual property and voting
rights in 1990. The German Federal Cartel Office expressed opposition
to the merger on the basis of the 80 % market share which would have
resulted in Germany. British objections eventually blocked the deal entirely. Meanwhile, in 1992, an OECD roundtable discussion of the
transaction highlighted the lack of uniformity of notification required
to cooperaby the various reviewing jurisdictions, as well as the 3barrier
7
tion posed by domestic confidentiality requirements.
The acquisition by Institut M~rieux International S.A. of Connaught Bio Sciences Inc. in 1989 had also been subjected to multijurisdictional merger review. Institut Mrieux, a French based pharmaceutical company, eventually purchased Connaught with the blessing of
the Director despite the complete monopolization of the rabies vaccine
35 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of September 21, 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 1990 O.J. L257/14.
36 Discussed in George Addy, InternationalCoordination of Competition Policies, in CoMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY 291, supra note 2, at 298; and Neil
Campbell and Michael J. Trebilcock, InternationalMerger Review: Problems of Multi-jurisdictional Conflict, in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT VORLD ECONOMY 129, 138
(Kautzenbach et al. eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellcshaft 1993).
37 Discussed in Addy, supra note 2, at 297; and Campbell and Trebilock, supra note 36, at
139.
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market in Canada. The Director reasoned that the size of the market
and the restrictive purchasing practices of provincial health authorities
meant that competition in Canada would not be substantially lessened
by the transaction. The merger had also been reviewed by the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, which consented to the
merger only on the condition that the Connaught rabies vaccine business in Toronto, Canada be leased to an FTC approved acquiror for a
period of twenty five years, and that M~rieux refrain from acquiring an
interest in any company producing a vaccine with respect to any disease for which M~rieux already produced a vaccine. In the face of Canadian objections to the control of Canadian assets by the U.S. authorities, the order was modified to require the concurrence of Canadian
authorities to the disposition of the Connaught lab in Toronto. 38
Some mergers are actually blocked as a result of the burdens of
multi-jurisdictional review, an example being the proposed purchase by
Minorco, S.A., a Luxembourg corporation, of Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC, a British corporation.39 Minorco sought to purchase the remaining 70.1 % of the Consolidated shares which Minorco did not already
own. Although a mere 2.5 % of Consolidated's stock was held in the
U.S., Consolidated owned a controlling interest in the largest U.S. gold
producer. Competition authorities in the U.S., the EC, the U.K. and
Australia approved the transaction. Consolidated itself then successfully sued in the United States under the Clayton Act to prevent the
transaction and obtained a preliminary injunction against the transaction. 40 A British white knight then came in to rescue Consolidated and
buy out Minorco's minority position.
Enhanced multi-jurisdictional cooperation and coordination of
merger review can offer significant benefits both to regulators and to
corporations. From an enforcement point of view, information exchanges would eliminate the possibility that unscrupulous corporations
might feed different information to different jurisdictions in an attempt
to have an anti-competitive merger approved. As we discuss in greater
detail below, however, any such information exchange would have to
address business concerns regarding confidentiality. Of greater practical significance for the merging firms would be a reduction in the regulatory burden through the harmonization of filing requirements, waiting periods, etc. Ultimately, the development of common substantive
approaches to merger review, as in other areas of competition law,
would also increase certainty and thus lower transaction costs in this
area.
With Canada's open economy and an increasingly multinational
38

See Campbell and Trebilcock, supra note 36, at 139, note 66.

39 Id. at 139.
'o Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 698 F. Supp. 487, affirmed, 871 F.2d 252

(2d Cir. 1989).
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world of business, Canadian antitrust authorities, like their counterparts elsewhere in the world, wish to extend their reach extra-territori-

ally in order to consider the impact of foreign actions on the Canadian

marketplace.4 1 In so doing, however, in order to avoid Uranium-type

clashes between governments, both coordination and cooperation between antitrust authorities will be required. In fact, developments since

the 1970's have rendered meaningful cooperation between Canada and
the United States, and beyond, a more realistic possibility. For one
thing, substantive antitrust laws in Canada and the United States have
come to be more closely aligned than had been the case in previous
decades. Laws relating to price and non-price vertical restraints, predatory pricing, monopolization and, to a large degree, horizontal agree-

ments in restraint of trade are essentially compatible. Certainly differences do exist, but experience has shown that these differences do not

have a significant effect on business behavior.42
As far as substantive merger law is concerned, the merger review
implemented in Canada in the late 1980's was modelled on that in the
41 The Canadian authorities' need for cooperation has existed for some time, but has likely

been exacerbated by the growing number of transborder issues. See Campbell, supra note 6, at
473, where, in 1978, in discussing the greater use by Canadian officials than by American officials
of the consultative mechanism in the Canada-U.S. Undertakings, Campbell posited that "the Antitrust Division is able to remedy many things itself or at least believes it can, whereas many of
the greater number of Canadian contacts are to solicit badly needed co-operation, rather than to
warn of the impact of Canadian actions on the United States."
42 Although the two laws relating to horizontal agreements are largely similar, the per se
illegal nature of many, especially horizontal, U.S. restrictive agreements which do not involve joint
ventures must be recognized. Such behavior is nonetheless regulated in Canada under a "rule of
reason" approach depending on the extent to which it lessens competition in the relevant market,
but the difference has not lead to rampant conspiratorial activity in Canada.
Another area where the two enforcement regimes differ in respect of horizontal agreements is
in the use of circumstantial evidence as the basis for finding an agreement. U.S. courts have
generally been more favorably disposed to finding agreements based on such evidence than have
the Canadian courts see R.J. ROBERTS, ROBERTS ON COMPETITION/ANTITRUST CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES, 90-101 (2d ed., Toronto: Butterworths, 1992). As a result, one might expect to
find that the incidence of overt "conscious parallelism" is somewhat higher in Canada than in the
United States. That said, some commentators feel that such behavior might nonetheless be addressed by the Director under the "joint dominance" theory. See Margaret Sanderson, Emerging
Issues in Competition Law, Address Presented to the Canadian Bar Association, Competition Law
Section, Living with the Competition Act in the 1990's: Do's and Don'ts for Business (September
30, 1993). In reality, business behavior in respect of horizontal agreements is likely not affected by
the differences in the substantive laws of the two countries.
The price discrimination provisions in the two laws do have significant practical differences.
In particular, the cost justification and meeting the competition features of the U.S. law, and the
quantity test and restriction to secondary line discrimination in the Canada law, have practical
implications for business. The requirement to show injury to competition in the U.S. deters wouldbe complainants or private suits. That said, the Price Discrimination Enforcement Guidelines
released in 1992 by the Director, indicate, with the permission of functional discounts and relaxation in the treatment of volume incentive plans, that the two regimes may be moving closer together with regard to this offense.
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United States. Moreover, the Merger Enforcement Guidelines
(MEG's) issued by the Director in 1991 were in large part based upon
the 1984 Merger Enforcement Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice. Businesses are thus assured that the basic approach of
each country to merger review is largely the same. That said, the "safe
harbor" threshold for combined market share below 35 % with a four
firm concentration ratio less than 65% indicated in the Canadian
MEG's is substantially higher than the 40% four firm concentration
ratio and individual pre-merger market shares of 7 % implied in the
U.S. version. 43 In addition, the statutory limitation of Canadian prenotification requirements to "operating businesses" in Canada indicates
that Canadian merger review is less likely to be concerned with purely
extra-territorial transactions. As shown by the FTC's actions with respect to Institut Mrieux, however, United States merger review is not
discouraged merely because of a lack of assets of the merging parties in
the jurisdiction.44 Perhaps the most important distinction, however, is
the "total welfare" approach to the assessment of a merger's likely
competitive effects in Canada. This approach permits producer interests in the form of efficiencies to be gained from the merger to offset
the consumer harm which any lessening of competition might entail.
No such explicit balancing of producer and consumer interests is undertaken in the assessment by U.S. authorities of a merger's likely economic effects.
Despite the differences in some of the details of the substantive
provisions of Canadian and U.S. antitrust law, therefore, from a practical business point of view, the results are usually identical in terms of
permissible business behavior. Moreover, as is evidenced by the similarity of approaches in the two countries' MEG's, the substantive considerations which enter into merger analysis, and in particular the manner
in which the relevant markets are defined, mean that businesses in either country can be assured of a certain degree of familiarity and predictability in the enforcement of the other country's merger provisions.
In these circumstances, the way is paved at the conceptual level for
cooperation between the antitrust enforcement agencies in the two
" See Donald G. McFetridge, Globalization and Competition Policy (manuscript at 166, on
file with the authors).
" It should be noted that the threshold requirements for merger notification under the EC
Merger Regulations relate to turnover in the EC, and not to the presence of assets or an operating
business in the jurisdiction. As evidenced by the European Commission's October 2, 1991 decision
regarding the de Havilland case, EC merger review might be expected to follow the more expansive U.S. model in asserting the European Commission's jurisdiction to review the competitive
effects in the EC of any qualifying transaction with significant EC effects, and not merely those
with assets in the jurisdiction. For an examination of the EC Merger Regulation and a review of
its early application, see Ingo L.O. Schmidt, Early Experiences with the EEC Merger Control
System, in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY 109 (Kautzenbach
et al. eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellcshaft 1993).
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countries. With a less interventionist political climate in Canada since
the 1970's, moreover, the political will for increased cooperation and
effective antitrust enforcement would also appear to be established. Finally, the Canadian courts themselves have recognized that effective
law enforcement in an interconnected world occasionally requires the
application of Canadian law to foreign actors and events and vice
versa.45 Acceptance of extra-territoriality in the Canadian legal system
indicates that the reaction to U.S. enforcement activities involving
Canadians should be somewhat more accommodating than during the
Potash and Uranium disputes.
Where there is a will, there is a way. The Director has indicated
that he considers the enhancement of enforcement cooperation to be a
priority "so that we can get at anti-competitive behaviour that is not
housed in Canada. '48 He has also indicated that a greater ability to
disclose information would enable him to inform other jurisdictions
when he discovers anti-competitive activity aimed at their markets
rather than Canadian markets.47 In addition, he considers that the
quality of merger review might be enhanced through increased cooperation between the various enforcement agencies. In light of the degree
to which the economies of Canada and the United States are intertwined, it seems obvious that the most significant front for cooperation
from a Canadian perspective would be with the United States. To
achieve true efficiency in international antitrust enforcement, however,
cooperation must go beyond the bilateral front. The will for antitrust
cooperation has clearly been established. What remains, then, is to examine the various options for reform in that regard.
IV.

OPTIONS FOR REFORM

Unilateral Reform

A.

Although substantively uniform antitrust laws in both Canada and
the United States would theoretically serve to reduce the instances of
friction between enforcement efforts in the two countries, there is probably no need to attempt to achieve broad substantive harmonization at
this time. The present legal regimes are compatible in principle and, as
outlined above, do not lead to serious confusion or divergent behaviors
among businesses in the two jurisdictions. As noted by the Director: "It
must be remembered that the antitrust statute of each nation-state reflects a host of country-specific factors. Such factors include the coun"

See dicta and cases, cited in Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178.

46 George Addy, Director of Investigation and Research, Quoted in John Geddes, New com-

petition cop on global trail, FINANCIAL POST, Jan. 27, 1994, at 11.
11 Addy, InternationalCoordinationof Competition Policies,in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY,
48

Id. at 296.

supra note 2, at 298.
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try's legal system, current stage of economic development, its business
culture, and its past experience with antitrust law and enforcement. It
is neither possible nor desirable to ignore all of these differences in the
name of international harmonization.
That said, there are some changes in the substantive laws of each
country which would reduce the potential for antitrust friction more
than others. Removal of the "beggar thy neighbor" exemptions for export cartels from the Competition Act,5" the Webb Pomerene Act, 51
and the Export TradingAct of 1982,2 for instance, would remove the
apparent hypocrisy of permitting otherwise criminal behavior so long as
the victims are foreigners. Indeed, as noted by Mr. Justice La Forest in
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Libman: "In a shrinking
world, we are all our brother's keepers. In the criminal arena this is
underlined by the international cooperative schemes that have been developed among national law enforcement agencies. ' 53
In terms of unilateral procedural changes which might usefully be
considered, the elimination of the oft-criticized private treble damage
actions in the U.S. would also eliminate the need for clawback legislation and remove the incentive for purely protectionist private antitrust
claims in the U.S. against Canadian exporters.54
It is in the area of merger review, perhaps, that the prospects for
harmonization are the greatest. Harmonization of pre-notification filing
procedures could easily be accomplished without impinging upon antitrust principles of either country, and would significantly reduce the
administrative burden on transborder merger participants. Uniform
thresholds may not be appropriate in light of the imbalance in the sizes
of the two economies, but common definitions of a "merger" might usefully be explored, along with uniform substantive filing requirements,
common waiting periods, and. common fixed time limits within which to
make a decision as to whether or not to challenge the merger.
Even if the procedural and substantive provisions of the antitrust
laws in Canada and the United States were identical, however, differences in enforcement priorities and differential impacts upon the two
economies would prevent uniform results of national antitrust reviews.
"No degree of procedural and substantive harmonization can eliminate
49

Id. at 301.

50 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 (as amended).

51 15 U.S.C. § 61-65 (1982).
52 15 U.S.C. § 4001-4053 (1982).
53 Libman v. The Queen, supra note 29, at 214.
The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, supra note 23, § 8 permits the Attorney General of Canada to reduce the amount of foreign money judgments if he is of the opinion that
significant Canadian interests in relation to the international trade or commerce are affected. Section 9(1) of the FEMA permits a Canadian to sue in Canada to recover from a person who has
obtained and enforced an antitrust judgment abroad the amount of "excessive" damages as specified by the Attorney General. See Graham, supra note 29.
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the qualitative judgements entailed in merger review nor the possibility
that different agencies will reach different judgments, albeit within a
common legal framework." 55
Consultation and cooperation between Canadian and U.S. antitrust authorities will therefore continue to be essential in order to avoid
potential conflicts, to minimize those that do occur, and to enable each
country to effectively police anti-competitive behavior. The informal,
biannual senior officials meetings which have been held since 1990 ensure that the open dialogue and communication essential to fruitful cooperation is maintained, as does the program of personnel exchanges
between the Bureau of Competition Policy and the Department of Justice.56 Even with such a spirit of cooperation, however, further development of the 1984 MOU could serve to significantly enhance the ability
of the two countries to effectively police transborder activities.
B.

Future Development of the 1984 MOU

The notification and consultation procedures outlined in the 1984
MOU, along with its stated intentions regarding cooperation and the
growing informal ties between antitrust enforcement officials in the two
countries appear to have been successful in avoiding or reducing antitrust friction in recent years. As a review of the MOU shows, however,
the MOU was aimed more at avoiding conflicts and safeguarding perceived attacks on Canadian sovereignty than at enhancing cooperation
in the international antitrust sphere. With the developments in the
world economy outlined above, the Director has expressed a desire to
increase substantive cooperation between Canada and other jurisdictions.57 Some options for future expansion of the MOU might include
provisions for mutual agreement on facts, joint investigations, and procedures for the adoption of a primary jurisdiction in transborder cases.
For instance, Canadian and U.S. antitrust authorities could be required to reach an agreement on the facts in a particular case involving
transnational issues. Although this would not guarantee identical enforcement results, it should remove a significant source of differing results. For example, an issue in a number of merger cases is whether the
party being acquired is failing or about to fail. It is possible that the
antitrust authorities in each country might take a different view of that
question. An understanding whereby there had to be agreement on
facts with respect to market definition, barriers to entry, product definition, and failing firms in transborder merger cases might go a long way
to reducing divergent results in cases affecting both parties.
Somewhat more ambitious might be the amendment of the MOU
55Trebilcock and Campbell, supra note 36, at 147.
56 Addy, supra note 2, at 295.
11 Addy, quoted in FinancialPost, supra note 46.
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to provide for joint investigations in antitrust cases. It would be neces-

sary to have a mechanism to decide the cases where a joint effort was
appropriate or necessary. Joint efforts could go some distance toward
facilitating agreements on facts and, ultimately, consistent enforcement

decisions. Since this proposal would not extend beyond the enforcement
activities of the antitrust agencies, it would not deal with the judicial

questions of jurisdiction5" or applicable law, or provide a means to have
one joint judicial body determine such cases.
Another possible step toward greater cooperation would be the establishment of criteria to decide which antitrust agency would have pri-

mary jurisdiction to handle any particular transborder case. The basic
notion of primary jurisdiction is the exercise of restraint by one country
in the enforcement of its law through the recognition of a greater rationale for jurisdiction resting with the other party. An assumption of
such a system is that the degree of discretion necessary to allow deferral to another jurisdiction exists in the present Canadian and U.S. anti59
trust regimes however such discretion does not exist at present.
Some features of the recent U.S.-European Community agree58With respect to jurisdiction, recent comments by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Morguard and Hunt indicate that in potentially multi-jurisdictional cases Canadian courts can
and should consider the reasonableness of either enforcing foreign judgments or asserting jurisdiction in light of the principle of international comity. In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1094, La Forest J. wrote: "Modern States. . . cannot live in splendid
isolation ..
" In Hunt, La Forest J. said: "Greater comity is required in our modern era when
international transactions involve a constant flow of products, wealth and people across the globe."
Hunt v. T&N P/C, supra note 5.
In the United States, the line of cases flowing from the Timberlane decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals provides the basis for U.S. courts to refrain from asserting jurisdiction in every
possible case should a more reasonable jurisdiction present itself. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 53 U.S.L.W. 3895 (U.S. June 25, 1985)
(No. 84-1761) cited in Dyal, supra note 3, at 1076. The flexibility provided by the Timberlane
case has likely been considerably restricted, however, by the United States Supreme Court's 5:4
decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 65:1621 ATRR 30 (June 28, 1993). Amicus
curaie briefs were filed by both the U.K. and Canada in this case to the effect that the impugned
actions of the London-based reinsurers were permissible under a complete U.K. regulatory scheme
and that the application of the Sherman Act to such conduct would not be reasonable in light of
the principle of international comity. The majority held that principles of international comity
would only mitigate against exerting jurisdiction in cases where the defendants were required by
foreign law to act in a fashion prohibited by the United States, or where compliance with the laws
of both countries was otherwise impossible. The strong minority opinion written by Mr. Justice
Scalia, called this a "breathtakingly broad proposition," which would "bring the Sherman Act and
other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries particularly our closest trading partners." Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 65:1621
ATRR 30, 46 (June 28, 1993). Although the majority judgment left Timberlane intact, its rather
narrow approach to the application of Timberlane may have set the stage for further friction in
international antitrust enforcement.
11 Section 10 of the Competition Act requires the Director to investigate whenever he thinks
a matter warrants enforcement action or he receives a sworn complaint from six Canadian residents. This duty would appear to be mandatory and non-delegable.
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ment60 might be incorporated into any updated MOU between Canada
and the United States. Notification and consultation procedures could
be extended to cover regulatory and judicial actions in which one of the
parties intervenes or participates. The biannual meetings could be institutionalized in order to ensure that they survive current and future
rounds of budget cut-backs in the two administrations. The parties
could be called upon to inform each other of activities which come to
their attention which would have an anti-competitive impact on the
other's economy. In this case, in light of the substantive differences between the two legal regimes, it would be necessary to ensure that information would be provided only with respect to actions which, if their
effects were felt in the informing jurisdiction, would be valid objects of
investigations there and subject to similar penalties.
Perhaps of the greatest potential significance, however, are the
provisions in the EC-U.S. agreement relating to cooperation and coordination in antitrust enforcement activities. As in the Canada-U.S.
MOU, each party is required to assist the other if such assistance is in
accord with its own interests and laws. The EC-U.S. MOU goes further, however, and provides a list of factors to consider in deciding
whether coordination is in the best interests of the parties. Such factors
include the cost and enforcement efficiencies which could result from
coordination, and the other party's interests (i.e., comity). Perhaps
most innovative, however, are the "positive comity" provisions 6' which
allow for one party, when it decides that conduct in the other's territory
is contrary to its important interests, to request that the other party
take action against the conduct. 62 This provision permits the requested
country to avoid the extraterritorial application of the first country's
laws by itself asserting jurisdiction over actions taken within its territory. Although the provision is voluntary, and the idea of deferring to a
foreign jurisdiction to enforce its antitrust laws in respect of effects felt
in the domestic economy may conflict with notions of sovereignty, in
the field of merger review they might actually prove to be the most
workable and the least contentious. If this idea eventually could be developed into a workable mechanism for antitrust enforcement generally, it has the potential to avoid the sort of extra-territorial enforcement actions which have caused friction in the past.
In order to implement any of these developments in a meaningful
way, it would be necessary to amend domestic laws in both countries to
60 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, September
23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487. See summary and discussion in William K. Walker, Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The Effect of the European Community - United States
Antitrust Agreement, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583 (1992).
61 Walker, supra note 60, at 33.
2 EC-US Agreement, supra note 60, at art. V, para. 2.
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permit the antitrust authorities to exchange information and to exercise
discretion in the transborder investigations so that comity principles
could be applied. The confidentiality provisions, in particular, have
been identified as posing the biggest obstacle to meaningful cooperation
even under the existing framework.6 3 The challenge will be to strike the
appropriate balance between safeguarding business concerns for confidentiality sufficiently so that business cooperation with antitrust investigations is not impaired, and permitting antitrust authorities to share
the information necessary to form agreed sets of facts, to jointly investigate an issue, or to choose a lead jurisdiction.
In our view, the current provisions of the Competition Act (the
Act) do not permit the disclosure of case-specific information by Bureau officers to foreign antitrust authorities, even for the purpose of
gathering information in that particular case. Subsection 10(3) of the
Act provides that all inquiries conducted by the Director "shall be conducted in private". This is reinforced in subsection 29(1), which prohibits anyone involved in the administration or enforcement of the Act
from communicating, among other things, the identity of anyone from
whom information has been obtained, or any information obtained pursuant to the Director's compulsory powers to gather evidence. The exception to this prohibition on disclosure permits disclosure to "a Canadian law enforcement agency or for the purposes of the administration
or enforcement of this Act." By virtue of section 126 of the Canadian
Criminal Code, willing disclosure of information in violation of the prohibition in subsection 29(1) of the Act is an indictable offense, punishable on conviction by up to two years in prison.
Subsections 10(3) and 29(1) would appear to constrain the Director from disclosing information obtained pursuant to an inquiry to any
foreign law enforcement agency. In our view, the explicit reference to
Canadian law enforcement agencies in subsection 29(1) negates any
possible implication that disclosure for "the purposes of the administration or enforcement of this Act" contemplates disclosure to foreign law
enforcement agencies. This is also consistent with the stipulation that
disclosure be permitted for the enforcement of this Act and not that of
another state. Furthermore, if the latter part of the exemption extended
to all law enforcement agencies, and indeed to anyone to whom disclosure was deemed convenient, then both the exemption for Canadian law
enforcement agencies, and the stipulation that investigations be conducted in private would be redundant.
This view is reinforced when one compares the limited approach to
disclosure permitted under the Competition Act with the broad disclosure permitted under subsection 231(2) by investigators appointed pursuant to section 229 of the Canada Business Corporations Act
" Addy, supra note 2, at 297-98.
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(CBCA). Subsection 231(2) of the CBCA provides as follows:
In addition to the powers set out in the order appointing him, an
inspector appointed to investigate a corporation may furnish to, or
exchange information and otherwise cooperate with, any public official in Canada or elsewhere who is authorized to exercise investigatory powers and who is investigating, in respect of the corporation,
any allegation of improper conduct that is the same as or similar to
the conduct described in subsection 229(2).
The contrast between the wording of subsection 29(1) of the Competition Act and subsection 231(2) of the CBCA makes it clear that the
Director is not currently permitted to exchange information in a manner which would be necessary if there were to be agreed sets of facts in
transborder cases, or joint investigations or deferral to lead
jurisdictions.
A disclosure provision such as that contained in the CBCA would
be improper unless there were a concomitant safeguard for the confidentiality of the information once it is provided to the U.S. authorities
and a proviso that information only be exchanged pertaining to alleged
violations which would be actionable in both jurisdictions and, if actionable, subject to similar penalties. Perhaps a leaf could be taken
from the U.S.-Australia Agreement 64 in this regard, by providing that
information supplied by the other country's authorities is not to be used
as evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding without the
consent of the supplying country. Better yet, in view of the reliance
historically placed by Canadian antitrust authorities on voluntary cooperation by target companies with the Director's investigations, the
MOU should contain a complete prohibition on such use. The receiving
country would be notified of potential violations of its laws, but would
be forced to gather its own evidence independently. This provision
would be consistent with the development of agreed sets of facts, joint
investigations and deferral to lead jurisdictions as referred to above.
Moreover, any confidentiality requirements to which each country
would be bound in respect of information supplied by the other country
must be backed up by equivalent sanctions as are imposed for breaches
of confidentiality in respect of information obtained from domestic
parties.65
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 702. See
King, supra note 21, for a discussion of this agreement and a comparison to the U.S.-Germany
agreement, as well as to the 1959 and 1969 Understandings.
15 Addy, supra note 2, at 300. The authors note that the passage of the International Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1994 in the United States has given the updating of the MOU new
impetus. This Act permits the U.S. Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission to enter
into agreements to provide information and other assistance to foreign antitrust agencies, condi-

tional on reciprocity of assistance and confidentiality safeguards.
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Bilateral solutions to the problems of policing transborder business
can, however, only go so far. Although the majority of international
business and trade in Canada is with the United States, the plethora of
reviewing jurisdictions in the Gillette/Wilkinson merger and the multitude of nations which were offended by the Uranium cases bear witness
to the utility of broadening cooperation beyond these two countries.
Moreover, so long as such bilateral understandings are voluntary and
subject to existing domestic law, even the broadest statements of good
intent can be thwarted on a practical level. Indeed, Davidow and Chiles
referred in 1978 to the "general attitude that the voluntary, non-public,
bilateral, diplomatic approach to international business conflict resolution constitutes a cosmetic formula designed to indicate goodwill and
diplomatic accessibility while actually disguising a basic unwillingness
to surrender national discretion in the economic arena." 66 Owing to the
convergence of enforcement philosophies in Canada and the United
States since 1978, we would not subscribe to such a gloomy view of the
efficacy of expanding the provisions of the MOU. Nonetheless,
strengthened and expanded MOU's can be seen as building blocks on
the road to more comprehensive methods of policing international antitrust affairs: ". . .because of the territorial limitations of the jurisdiction of competition authorities, a truly international framework
cannot
''67
result from a purely bilateral or even trilateral approach.
C. Multilateral Approaches to InternationalAntitrust Enforcement
Regardless of the shape which any supranational antitrust enforcement mechanism might eventually take, continued work will be required to identify areas where substantive laws presently diverge, and
to attempt to develop consensus in those regards. The OECD's work in
the development of recommendations for multilateral antitrust enforcement 68 could be usefully directed toward the coordination of competition policies. The fact that the development of common ground rules
will take years should not deter the process. In addition, more empirical
research into the actual anti-competitive effects of many of the practices which national antitrust agencies are commonly called upon to
assess (e.g., international strategic alliances, vertical restraints, transnational mergers, etc.) would assist in the development of a consensus
" Joel Davidow and Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary
Nature of InternationalCodes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 247 (1978), quoted in King, supra note 21, at 79, note 135.
11 Bail, supra note 30, at 285.
68 OECD Recommendations, supra note 8. The biannual conferences under UNCTAD which
lead to the promulgation of the Set of MultilaterallyAgreed Principlesand Rules for the Control
of Restrictive Business Practices, G.A. Resolution 35/63, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/63 (1980)
might also provide such a forum, although the larger number of countries involved may render
this impractical.
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in antitrust enforcement.69 The promulgation by national antitrust authorities of guidelines such as those published by the Director relating
to mergers, price discrimination, predatory pricing and misleading advertising would also add to the transparency of national antitrust ento the dialogue which is essential
forcement policies, and so contribute
70

if consensus is to be encouraged.

Looking down the road to possible supranational enforcement, sev-

eral options have been proposed in the antitrust literature. The EC and
the broader European Economic Area already provide a model for supranational antitrust enforcement, 71 and some have speculated as to
whether the EC model might be applicable elsewhere.7 2 The contrast
between the tortured road to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay

Round GATT discussions 73 and the comparative ease with which Canada and the United States and Mexico were able to negotiate the
NAFTA supports the theory that regional consensus in supranational

business regulation might be achieved more easily than global agreement. "Regional competition policies should therefore be seen as necessary building blocks for a coherent multilateral system. ' 7 4 The development of an EC style competition law applicable to the NAFTA would
nonetheless be an imposing challenge, as the three countries would
have to agree on a common set of competition rules, and agree to grant

binding authority to a supranational administrative authority as well as
to a common supranational court.7 5 Given the inability so far of Canada and the United States to agree on a common set of rules regard-

ing anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions, the development of a
NAFTA competition authority with binding power to investigate and
6 See, e.g., Ronald Corvari, Marie Lavoie and Caroline Pestieau, Trends in Foreign Direct

Investment and Joint Ventures: Their Impact on Technological Accumulation and Competition in
Canada in the 1980's, in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY 51
(Kautzenbach et al. eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellcshaft 1993).
70 Campbell and Trebilcock, supra note 36, at 147.
71 As described by Christopher Bright: "The (European Commission) has full power to collect information, investigate and enforce throughout the 12 member states and there is one supreme judicial body - the European Court of Justice. Under the EEA Agreement, twin authorities
- the EC Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority - have equal powers in the EC and
EFTA respectively. The EC Commission is required to use its information-gathering and investigatory powers to assist the EFTA Surveillance Authority in enforcement work by the latter in the
EC and vice versa. There is express power to exchange confidential information and business
secrets. Decisions by either body are enforceable throughout the twelve EC member states and
seven EFTA countries. The European Court of Justice sits over EC Commission decisions and a
new EFTA court over decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority." Bright, Internationalisation of anti-trust, 136:39 SOLICITORS J. 990 (October 9, 1992).
72 Bail, supra note 30, at 295; Campbell and Trebilcock, supra note 36, at 153.
73 Launched in November, 1986 and concluded at the meeting of trade ministers in Marrakesh, Morocco from April 12-15, 1994.
7" Bail, supra note 30, at 285.
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prosecute in respect of transborder competition law issues is likely still
some years in the future.
One alternative for multi-jurisdictional merger review, suggested
by Campbell and Trebilcock, is the expansion of the primary review
jurisdiction proposed for the MOU to a multilateral setting.78 A coordinating agency could be chosen from among the nations who would
be affected by the transaction, possibly that which would be most affected by the transaction, or perhaps that in which the largest portion
of the assets of the companies is found. The lead jurisdiction would coordinate the gathering of information from all affected states, perform
an analysis, and formulate an opinion which would be binding in its
own jurisdiction, but take the form of a recommendation for action to
enforcement authorities in the other jurisdictions. Such a mechanism
would require rules for identifying mergers with multinational effects,
and for choosing the lead jurisdiction. In addition, confidentiality rules
in most jurisdictions would have to be modified to permit the provision
of information to authorities in the lead jurisdiction. A stronger version
of the lead jurisdiction model as suggested by Campbell and Trebilcock
would provide that the lead jurisdiction's decision in respect of a
merger would be binding in all affected nations. Such a development
would require agreement on criteria and methods for merger analysis,
as well as cooperation and agreement between nations in whose markets the effects of the merger would be felt and those in which the
merging parties' assets are located. A dispute resolution mechanism
would also strengthen this option.
Lead jurisdiction review still involves other nations entrusting antitrust enforcement with respect to their jurisdictions to some other national enforcement agency. It is not clear that many nations would willingly forego jurisdiction in favor of an agency that might have its own
national priorities. Accordingly, a supranational antitrust authority has
been proposed by many,77 either in the form of a disinterested dispute
resolution body, or in the form of an independent and binding supranational antitrust authority.
One example, the Draft InternationalAntitrust Code published by
the ABA International Antitrust Code Working Group on July 10,
1993, proposes minimum standards for national antitrust laws, and the
establishment of an International Antitrust Authority under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to be established pursuant to the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.7 8 Concentrations
with international dimensions would be notified to all national antitrust
• Campbell and Trebilcock, supra note 36, at 147.
See generally, papers by Ostry, Bail, Addy and Ruppelt, in section IV, International Coordination of Competition Policies?, in COMPETITION POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
ECONOMY (Kautzenbach et al. eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellcshaft, 1993).
7 Special Supplement, 64:1628 ATRR, (August 19, 1993).
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enforcement agencies affected, as well as to the International Antitrust
Authority. 9 The International Antitrust Authority would be an independent body established within the institutional framework of the
WTO. Its powers would include the power to request actions in individual antitrust cases or groups of cases to be instituted by a national
antitrust enforcement agency; to bring actions against national enforcement agencies if such agencies should refuse to take appropriate measures against individual restraints of competition; to sue private persons
or undertakings before national law courts asking for injunctions
against anti-competitive restraints of competition; to appeal from decisions of the national courts even when it was not a party in the trial,
but under the same conditions as the parties to the case; to sue a party
to the agreement for violations of the agreement; and to assist parties
to the agreement to promulgate antitrust laws and to institute efficient
antitrust administration.80
The Draft Code also envisages the establishment of a permanent
International Antitrust Panel to operate in the framework of the new
dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO. Provided consultations
were first tried but failed, this permanent six member body would be
authorized to adjudicate disputes between the parties to the agreement
with respect to alleged violations of the agreement. The Panel would
decide whether obligations under the agreement had been violated. If a
national judicial decision was found to be inconsistent with the obligations under the agreement, the competent national law court or other
authorities would have to reconsider their decisions respecting the findings of the Panel. 8 '
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The 1984 MOU between Canada and the United States regarding
transborder antitrust investigations was born out of a series of conflicts
reflecting divergent approaches to antitrust law in the two countries at
the time. Since that time, substantive law and enforcement philosophies
have converged somewhat, thereby reducing the severity and frequency
of incidents of antitrust friction between the two countries. No doubt,
the notification and consultation mechanisms of the 1984 MOU also
contributed to the increased understanding between the countries regarding antitrust enforcement.
In light of an increasingly interdependent business world, however,
there have been calls for an updated MOU in order to enhance the
ability of the antitrust authorities in both countries to cooperate in appropriate cases. The current disclosure provisions in the Competition
Id. at art. 10.
I9
0 Id. at art. 19.
81 Id. at art. 20.
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Act would have to be amended to permit some degree of sharing of
information between the regimes. At the same time, however, care
needs to be taken to safeguard businesses from undue disclosure and to
ensure at a minimum that the receiving party is bound to the same
degree of confidentiality as is the party providing the information. In
the immediate future, with each country independently applying its
own antitrust laws to actors and events which impact upon their own
economies, inclusion of a provision borrowed from the U.S.-Australian
agreement preventing the receiving party from using information as evidence in any administrative or judicial proceedings would lessen the
degree to which the sharing of information between the antitrust authorities will discourage businesses from providing information to either
the Director or the Antitrust Division.
For the long run, several models for a more integrated multinational approach to antitrust enforcement in transborder settings have
been proposed. These models take many shapes, and would require varying degrees of substantive harmony in the antitrust laws of the countries involved. Further discussion, and continued debate concerning the
relative merits of these models can only serve to clarify the underlying
issues and improve antitrust relations between the countries involved.

